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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
m
I. Whether an intrusive canine sniff at Joelis Jardines’s residence was a search under the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
II. Whether probable cause, supported by a valid warrant, should be the evidentiary showing 
required in order for law enforcement to conduct an intrusive canine sniff at an 
individual’s private residence.
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No. 11-564
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FALL TERM 2012
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Petitioner,
V.
JOELIS JARDINES,
Respondent.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida is reported aiJardines v. Florida, 73 So. 3d 
34 (Fla. 2011).
^ JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of a state appellate court upon granting 
a petition for writ of certiorari. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
LEG AL:05000-0277/2442824.1 1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
m
0
This Court reviews determination of reasonable suspicion and probable cause de novo. 
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690,699 (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History
On January 12,2007, Jardines was charged with Trafficking Cannabis and Grand Theft 
due to marijuana seized at his home. (J.A. 2, 17.) The Detectives searched Joelis Jardines’s 
residence after obtaining a search warrant prepared by Detective William Pedraja and signed by 
Judge George Sarduly of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida. (J.A. 110.) Before trial, 
Jardines filed a motion to suppress evidence claiming it was taken pursuant to a warrant that 
lacked the requisite probable cause. (J.A. 17.) The Circuit Court of Florida (“Circuit Court”) 
determined that “[ejven with great deference afforded to the search warrant, the probable cause 
affidavit did not provide a ‘substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.’” (J.A. 
135.) Thus, on June 13, 2007, the Circuit Court granted Jardines’s motion to suppress evidence. 
(J.A. 135.)
On October 22, 2008,the District Court of Appeal of Florida (“Court of Appeal”) 
reversed the Circuit Court on the basis there was no search, and even if there was, probable cause 
existed. Florida v. Jardines, 9 So. 3d 1,10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the Court of Appeal’s ruling and reinstated the 
Circuit Court’s decision, holding that; (1) a “sniff test” conducted at a private residence 
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment; (2) probable cause is the proper evidentiary 
showing of wrongdoing that the government must make prior to conducting a sniff test; and (3)
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the search warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause to support issuance of the warrant 
used to search Jardines's private residence. Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 34.
This Court granted the State of Florida’s petition for a writ of certiorari on January 6, 
2012. (J.A. 1.)
Statement of Facts
On November 3, 2006, the Miami-Dade Police Department received an anonymous tip 
alleging that the Jardines’s home at 13005 SW 257”' I'errace, Homestead, Florida (“home”) was 
being used to grow marijuana. (J.A. 8, 16.) An unknown and unverified tip only specified the 
location of the residence and that a potential growhouse was located there. (J.A. 8, 18.) One 
month after receiving the tip, the police department, along with agents of the Drug Enforcement 
Agency (“DEA”), conducted surveillance at Jardines’s home. (J.A. 16.) However, prior to the 
surveillance, the DEA agents had not corroborated the tip with any evidence. (J.A. 18.)
During the surveillance, no one entered or left the home and there were no vehicles on 
the property. (J.A. 43-44.) Detectives William Pedraja and Douglas Bartelt approached 
Jardines’s front door and began their investigation. (J.A. 57.) Detective Bartelt brought his drug 
detection canine, Franky, along with him. (J.A. 49.) Detective Bartelt maintained control of 
Franky via leash, even though he testified that handlers generally drop the leash when the dog is 
sniffing. (J.A. 51-52.)
Detective Bartelt testified that while conducting the sniff test, Franky radically pulled on 
the leash and began tracking an odor. (J.A. 49.) The detective stated that this type of behavior is 
called “bracketing” and is used to find the source of a particular odor. (J.A. 50-51.) Franky then 
sat down, which indicated that he detected an odor inside Jardines’s home. (J.A. 53.) Detective 
Bartelt subsequently informed Detective Pedraja of Franky’s alert. (J.A. 36.)
After receiving Franky’s alert, Detective Pedraja approached the front door and noticed 
the scent of marijuana for the first time. (J.A. 36.) Detective Bartelt, however, testified at trial 
that he smelled mothballs and did not detect the scent of marijuana during the investigation.
(J.A. 16, 55.) Detective Pedraja knocked on the front door, but received no response. (J.A. 37.) 
Detective Pedraja also alleges while at the door, the air conditioning unit inside was running 
continuously without recycling. (J.A. 37.) This, according to Detective Pedraja, was suspicious 
because individuals operating marijuana growhouses tend to run the air conditioning 
continuously to offset the heat generated by the growing equipment. (J.A. 38.) He also stated 
running the air conditioning unit results in abnormally high electricity bills. (J.A. 41.) However, 
at no point did the Detectives check the bills to corroborate the unverified tip. (J.A. 43.)
Detective Pedraja then left Jardines’s home and prepared a search warrant based solely
on his interpretation of Franky’s actions and observations during the investigation. (J.A. 17.) A
county judge approved the search warrant that same day. (J.A. 17.) Shortly thereafter, members 
of the police department and DEA agents executed the warrant and discovered a marijuana lab. 
(J.A. 17.) Jardines was subsequently arrested and charged on January 1,2007, with Trafficking 
Cannabis and Grand Theft of the third degree. (J.A. 2, 17.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should uphold the ruling by the Supreme Court of Florida that a sniff test by 
a drug detection dog at a private dwelling is a search under the Fourth Amendment and that a 
showing of probable cause is required prior to the search.
The dog sniff at Jardines’s home was impermissible without a warrant because it violated 
his reasonable expectation of privacy. This Court has continuously stated that the home is 
afforded the greatest constitutional protection because an individual has the highest expectation
of privacy therein. The dog sniff revealed intimate details ot Jardines’s home and thus 
encroached on the place where his Fourth Amendment protection is the greatest. While a narrow 
number of cases hold that dog sniffs are not searches, these cases do not involve the home and 
arc limited to areas that create a diminished expectation of privacy. Also, dog sniff technology is 
sophisticated and not in the general public use. This Court has held that the use of such sense 
enhancing technology to gain information from a home constitutes a search. Finally, police dogs 
often alert to scents that are not contraband, which further infringed on Jardines’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.
Since the dog sniff was an intmsive search, the standard of probable cause is required. 
Even if probable cause is not required, at the very minimum, this Court should require 
reasonable suspicion. However, probable cause is the appropriate standard because the sniff 
cannot be considered minimally invasive since any intrusion into the home is considered a major 
intrusion. Moreover, obtaining evidentiary support to meet probable cause is not unreasonably 
burdensome for police officers and adheres to Fourth Amendment protections. Ultimately, the 
facts articulated by the Detectives do not support a finding of either probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion and therefore the dog sniff at Jardines’s home was impermissible.
ARGUMENT
I. THE DOG SNIFF REVEALED INTIMATE DETAILS OF JARDINES’S PRIVATE 
HOME, VIOLATED HIS REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY, AND 
CONSTITUTED A FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH REQUIRING A SEARCH 
WARRANT BASED UPON PROBABLE CAUSE.
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
A search warrant is only issued upon a showing of “probable cause,” supported by an oath or 
affidavit, which must describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. Id.
'Fhe Fourth AmerKlment mandates that an impartial magistrate validate the claim of probable 
cause before issuing a search warrant. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
A warrant acts as a safeguard to protect against police conducting unreasonable and 
limitless searches of individual citizens. Id. at 356-57. Without a neutral third party reviewing 
the evidence, the discretion to obtain a warrant would lie with the police—those wishing to 
conduct the searches. Id. at 358-59; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). This 
would not provide an adequate safeguard and would likely lead to “after-the-event justification” 
of a search. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 (quoting Beckv. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964)). “[Tjhis Court 
has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find 
evidence of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intrusive 
means consistent with that end.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 356-57. Therefore, even if there are facts 
showing probable cause, a search conducted without a warrant is presumptively unlawful 
because the police did not follow the judicial procedure set by the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g.. 
Id. at 357; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
A. This Court Has Traditionally Afforded Great Constitutional Protection to the 
Home. Where a Person’s Expectation of Privacy Is at Its Absolute Highest.
Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless search is impermissible if it violates a 
person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Katz, 389 U.S. at 360. Justice Harlan’s 
concurring opinion in Katz established a two-prong test to determine whether a search is 
“reasonable.” Id. at 361. When applying this test, a court considers whether: (1) the person had 
an “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and (2) the expectation of privacy is one that 
“society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” Id. A person does not have an expectation of 
privacy in objects, activities, or statements that are exposed to the public if he has shown no 
intention of keeping them to himself. Id. Because such actions are in “plain view” of outsiders.
they do not fall under Fourth Amendment protection. Id.
Generally, the liome is afforded great constitutional protection. Kyllo v. United States, 
533 U.S. 27, 37-38 (2001). “At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a 
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” 
Silvermanv. United States, 5Q$,5\\ (1961). This Court has repeatedly held that an
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home, and this expectation is one that 
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37; United States v. 
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984); Payton v. New York, 455 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980); Silverman, 
365 U.S. at 511. This Court has reasoned that all details of the home are intimate details 
“because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37; see 
Karo, 468 U.S. at 714.
The “curtilage” of the home is also one of the areas protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
Oliver V. United States, 466 V.S. 170, 180(1984). This Court has defined “curtilage” as the area 
that is intimately linked to the home to which the activity of home life extends. United States v. 
Dtmn, 480 U.S. 294, 302 (1987); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1986). This 
Court has clearly established that the front door of a home and the area immediately adjacent to 
it are considered within the curtilage of the home. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 
227, 235 (1986); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178, 180.
1. Police action revealed private details of Jardines’s home and violated his 
reasonable expectation of privacy.
An investigation that obtains information that could have been acquired through visual 
surveillance is not a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 
276, 281-82 (1983). In Knotts, officers installed a beeper inside a container of chloroform, 
which one of the suspects subsequently purchased and placed in his car. Id. at 278. Officers
followed the car to the respondent’s cabin by both monitoring the beeper’s signals and using 
visual surveillance. Id. The container of chloroform never went inside of the cabin. Id. at 279. 
This Court held that the warrantless use of an electronic tracking device (a “beeper”) does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment if the same information could have been obtained through visual 
surveillance. A/, at 281-82.
A year after Knotts was decided, this Court was called upon to determine whether a 
beeper that reveals information that could not have been obtained through visual surveillance 
violates the Fourth Amendment. Karo, 468 U.S. at 707. In Karo, otficers placed a beeper in a 
can of ether, which they subsequently used to monitor a private residence not open to visual 
surveillance. 468 U.S. at 714. This Court recognized that the monitoring of a beeper is less 
intrusive than a full-scale search. Id. at 715. However, this Court did not conclude that the “less 
intrusive” nature of the method justified the government obtaining information about the interior 
of a private residence that they could not have otherwise obtained without a warrant. Id. 
Following the reasoning in Knotts, this Court held that monitoring the beeper in the respondent’s 
home violated his Fourth Amendment rights because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his home. Id. at 719.
Both Knotts and Karo affirm this Court’s long-standing respect for the sanctity of the 
home in the Fourth Amendment context. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282 (“Respondent Knotts, as the 
owner of the cabin,. .. undoubtedly had the traditional expectation of privacy within a dwelling 
place insofar as the cabin was concerned ...Karo, 468 U.S. at 714-15 (“Searches and 
seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable absent exigent 
circumstances.”). Knotts turned on the fact that at no time did the beeper reveal any information 
that would otherwise not been visible to the naked eye from outside of the private residence. 460
mU.S. at 285. The only information that the technology revealed was information about the 
respondent’s location on public streets, which this Court held did not constitute an area in which 
there can be a reasonable expectation of privacy, /d.’ In Karo, on the other hand, the beeper 
provided information about the inside of the respondent’s home. 468 U.S. at 719. This Court 
held that this violated his reasonable expectation of privacy and constituted an unlawful search. 
Id. A search that provides information about the details of interior of the home violates a 
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy because all details within a home are intimate details. 
Id.; see Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37. Ihus, the details of a person’s home are private, and anything that 
intrudes upon this privacy presumptively violates the Fourth Amendment. See Knotts, 460 U.S. 
at 282; Karo, 468 U.S. at 714-15.
Similarly, Jardines had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home and its 
curtilage—an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. A smell 
from within his residence constitutes an intimate detail. The Fourth Amendment s application 
does not “turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280. Thus, although the dog was not physically inside Jardines’s residence, 
the dog sniff effectively pierced the walls of his house and exposed something that was not open 
to surveillance from the outside. The dog sniff violated the privacy upon which he justifiably 
relied. Therefore, based on the Katz test, the dog sniff on Jardines’s residence violated his 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his home. Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court 
correctly held that the dog sniff was a substantial government intrusion into the sanctity of 
Jardines’s residence and constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment.
* A person driving a car on public streets knowingly exposes his location and, therefore, cannot have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. Information regarding 
the movements of a car on public roads is not an expectation of privacy that society is fully prepared to recognize. 
Id. Therefore, obtaining information regarding the location of a car on public roads is not a search. Id. at 285.
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2. This Court has held that people accept a diminished expectation of privacy
• as to luggage and cars when those items are in public; however, these
holdings are inapplicable to the dog sniff on Jardines’s home.
This Court has held that a dog sniff test does not violate the Fourth Amendment when
conducted on (1) luggage at an airport based on a reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity, (2)
the exterior of a vehicle that has been stopped at a checkpoint, or (3) the exterior ot a vehicle
subject to a lawful traffic stop. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 708 (1983); City of
0 Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
Place, Edmond, and Caballes relate only to dog sniffs on luggage and cars, which have a
diminished expectation of privacy when those items are in public. These cases do not apply to a
• private residence. As the Florida Supreme Court correctly noted, this Court carefully tied its 
rulings in Place, Edmond, and Caballes to the specific facts of each case.
In Place, the police seized the respondent’s luggage after he had been acting 
suspiciously. 462 U.S. at 698. Officials subjected his luggage to a dog sniff at the airport, and 
the dog alerted to narcotics. Id. at 699. The police ultimately discovered cocaine inside of his
bag. Id. This Court held, based on the particular facts of the case, the ninety-minute seizure and
m
subsequent search of the respondent’s luggage was unlawflil under the Fourth Amendment. Id. 
at 710. Regarding the dog sniff, this Court noted that the information obtained was limited to the 
^ contents of the luggage, which was in a public place and did not expose non-contraband items
hidden from view. Id. at 707. This Court also stated that there was no other investigative 
procedure that could have been done at an airport that would have been as limited in scope. Id.
• Thus, the limited scope and public location of the search in Place ensured that the defendant was 
not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience of a more intrusive investigative method. 
Id.
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In Edmond, the police stopped the respondent and other drivers at a dnig checkpoint and 
had a drug-detecting canine walk around the exterior of the vehicles. 531 U.S. at 35. The goal 
of the checkpoint was to search for “ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” Id. at 41-42. This Court 
held that the purpose of the checkpoint and its dragnet style, without individualized suspicion, 
violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 48. In so holding, this Court noted that the dog sniff did 
not necessarily transform the seizure into a search and focused instead on the purpose and nature 
of the checkpoint. Id. at 40. As in Place, the location and context of the search drove the 
analysis of this Court in Edmond. Id. at 48.
In Caballes, a police officer subjected the respondent’s vehicle to a dog sniff during a 
lawful traffic stop. 543 U.S. at 406. This Court noted that there was no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the exterior of a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop. Id. at 409. This Court followed 
Place in holding that a dog sniff that does not expose non-contraband items lawfully hidden from 
view does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id.
Place, Edmond, and Caballes stand in stark contrast to the heightened privacy interests 
that are associated with the home. First, the sniff tests in Place, Edmond, and Caballes were 
conducted on suspicious objects—cars and luggage—that are not granted special protection 
under the Fourth Amendment while those objects are in public. A search of an automobile has 
long been an exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment. Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). This is because an individual has a lesser expectation 
of privacy in his vehicle since it is used for transportation and its contents are in plain view. Mew 
Yorkv. Class,475V.S. 106, 112-14(1986). Similarly, a person’s luggage at an airport has not 
been granted special protection under the Fourth Amendment because the airport is a public 
place. Place, 462 U.S. at 701-03. Thus, it is well established that a person has a diminished
expectation of privacy in his luggage at an airport. Id. Here, however, the dog sniff test was not 
conducted on an item in which Jardines had a diminished expectation of privacy. The sniff test 
was conducted on his private residence, where Jardines had the highest expectation of privacy.
Second, the sniff tests in Place, Edmond, and Caballes were conducted under 
circumstances where the suspects had a reduced expectation of privacy. These cases did not turn 
solely on the public location of the searches, but also on the other surrounding circumstances that 
gave rise to suspicious activity. In Place, the respondent’s luggage was seized based on 
reasonable suspicion. Id. at 699. In Edmond, the car was seized in a dragnet-style checkpoint.
531 U.S. at 35. In Caballes, the car was seized during a lawful traffic stop. 543 U.S. at 406. In 
the present case, the Detectives only had an anonymous tip that there was a growhouse at 
Jardines’s residence. (J.A. 8, 63.) This tip was unverified and remained unsupported by any 
evidence obtained by Detective Pedraja’s cursory, fifteen-minute surveillance of Jardines s
home. (J.A. 18,31-32.) Indeed, the fact that there were no cars coming in and out of the
driveway at 7:00 a.m. (J.A. 43-44.), which would be expected if drug transactions were occurring 
at Jardines’s residence, undermined the veracity of the unsubstantiated tip. Moreover, while 
Jardines’s blinds were closed and his AC was running (J.A. 8-9, 37.), this merely could have 
been because it is hot in South Florida. These signs do not necessarily suggest unlawful 
behavior. Therefore, the dog sniff test was not conducted in a situation in which the surrounding 
circumstances gave rise to suspicious activity.
Third, the dog sniff tests in Place, Edmond, and Caballes did not cause public 
embarrassment and humiliation. In each of these cases, the items were discoimected from the 
suspects. In Place, the police took the luggage from one airport to another in order to conduct 
the sniff test. 462 U.S. at 696. There is minimal, if any, humiliation in a dog sniff on unattended
luggage. See, e.g., Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist, 690 F.2d 470, 477 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(contrasting a dog snitY on a child at school with a dog snitTon unattended luggage at an airport). 
In Edmond and Caballes, there was a degree of anonymity during the roadside sniff test. 
However, there is no anonymity when a dog sniff is used on a person’s private residence. 
Government activity around Jardines’s home may have raised suspicion of involvement in 
criminal activity. The investigation was in broad daylight and in plain view of his neighbors and 
passersby, causing embarrassment and humiliation for Jardines. Because the sniff test and hours 
of police activity were conducted around his home, Jardines had no anonymity. Therefore, the 
sniff created an unjustified public spectacle.
Moreover, there were less intrusive measures open to the police in this case. Detective 
Pedraja himself stated that he could have obtained a court order to investigate whether Jardines’s 
electricity bills were abnormally high. (J.A. 43.) He did not do so, either before or after the dog 
snitY. (J.A. 43.) The Detectives also could have spent more than fifteen minutes doing visual 
surveillance before using the drug-detecting dog. Although the Government may argue that 
exigent circumstances mandated quick action, this clearly was not the case. See infra, §11.A.3. 
Unlike in Place, Edmond, and Caballes, where the objects were in transit, Jardines s home was 
not going anywhere. There was also no indication that he had been alerted to the Detectives 
suspicions and was in the process of destroying evidence. Therefore, less intrusive investigative 
procedures could—and should—have been used before using the invasive dog sniff on Jardines’s 
home without a warrant.
Place, Edmond, and Caballes are not applicable to the home because a person has a 
lesser expectation of privacy in his luggage and vehicle when these items are in a public. This 
Court has long recognized a person’s heightened expectation of privacy in his home. See supra.
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§ see, e.g., Karo, 468 U.S. at 714; Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37; Payton, 455 U.S. at 589-90; 
Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511. The mere presence of contraband did not diminish Jardines’s 
privacy interest in the entirety of his home. The area of the home as a whole is protected from 
unlawful government searches. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37. Therefore, the warrantless dog snitf on 
Jardines’s residence violated his reasonable expectation of privacy and constituted an illegal 
search under the Fourth Amendment.
B. Dog Sniff Technology Is Fallible. Is Not in General Public Use, and Provides 
Information That Is Not in Plain View and Would Be Impossible or 
Impermissible To Obtain Without a Search Warrant.
In Place, this Court stated that dog sniffs are “sui generis” because they are limited in 
that they only detect contraband. 462 U.S. at 707. This argument relies on the fact that dogs are 
(1) accurately alerting to contraband and (2) only alerting to contraband. Nina Paul & Will 
Trachman, Fidos and Fi-don 'tx: Why the Supreme Court Should Have Found a Search in Illinois 
V. Caballes, 9 Boalt J. Crim. L. 1,28 (2005). This Court also specifically endorsed the dog sniff 
based on its accuracy in United States v. Jacobsen. 466 U.S. 109, 122'-24 (1984) (relying on the 
reasoning in Place and finding that the field test at issue accurately disclosed only whether a 
white powder was cocaine).
1. Police dogs are prone to error and do not detect only contraband.
The infallible drug-detecting dog does not exist. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411 (Souter, J., 
dissenting). The dog sniff and alert is evidently not as accurate as Place assumed. See infra, §
II. A. Treating the use of dog sniffs as “sui generis” and then using that as a reason to say that 
they are not searches under the Fourth Amendment is clearly flawed. Therefore, this Court 
should not extend the faulty reasoning in Place to dog sniffs at private residences.
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The Government may argue that drug-detecting canines are sufficiently reliable. Lower 
courts, such as the Court of Appeal in the present case, have construed “accuracy” merely to 
mean “fair probability of accuracy.” Leslie A. Lunney, Has the Fourth Amendment Gone to the 
Dogs?: Unreasonable Expansion of Canine Sniff Doctrine to Include Sniffs of the Home^ 88 Or.
L. Rev. 829, 862 (2009); see. e.g.. People v. Jones, 755 N.W. 2d 224,228 (Mich. Ct. App.
2008); Jardines, 9 So. 3d at 5. These courts have used the “sui generis” label to justify the use of 
drug-detecting dogs while ignoring the accuracy rationale that this Court actually used in Place 
md Jacobsen. Id. This misinterpretation completely negates the reasoning ol Place and 
Jacobsen, which was premised, to a large extent, on the fact that dog sniffs were 100% accurate. 
Lunney, supra, at 861.
Furthermore, police dogs do not detect only contraband. For example, with cocaine, 
drug-detecting dogs do not alert to the cocaine itself but alert to methyl benzoate, a vapor by­
product of cocaine. Id. at 862. Methyl benzoate is also commonly found in household items, 
such as perfumes, solvents, and insecticides. Jacobson v. $55,900 in U.S. Currency, 728 N.W.
2d 510, 534-35 (Minn. 2007). In Horton, for example, a drug dog alerted to the methyl benzoate 
found in a bottle of perfume in a student’s purse. 690 F.2d at 474. This creates a problem 
because it will be impossible for a dog handler to tell whether a dog is alerting to a lawful or 
unlawful substance. Ergo, a dog’s detection of a lawful item within a home invades a person s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.
2. Because the dog sniff is an advanced, sense-enhancing technology that is 
not in genera! public use, it should not have been used on Jardines s home 
without a search warrant.
Even if drug-detecting dogs were 100% accurate, their use would still be a search under 
the Fourth Amendment. This Court has held that the use of sense-enhancing technology not in
general public use to obtain information regarding the interior of a private home constitutes a 
search. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41. In Kyllo, government agents used thermal-imaging technology to 
detect relative amounts of heat radiating from within a private home. Id. at 29. This Court 
emphasized that the technology provided information regarding the interior of a private home 
that could not have otherwise been obtained without physical intrusion. Id. at 34. This Court 
also noted that the sense-enhancing technology was not in general public use and, therefore, a 
person would not reasonably expect it to be used on his home. Id.
The present case is similar to Kyllo in three main respects. First, the sense-enhancing 
technology was used on the home. Similar to how the agents used the thermal-imaging 
technology on a residence in Kyllo, here, the Government used the dog-sniff technology on 
Jardines’s home. Generally, the home is afforded great constitutional privacy. Id. at 37-38; see 
supra, § I.A. Second, the technology allowed Detectives to deduce information that could not 
have otherwise been obtained without intruding upon the interior of the home. In Kyllo, agents 
could not have detected the relative amounts of heat emanating from the respondent s home 
without the use of the thermal-imaging device. 533 U.S. at 34. Similarly, Detectives Pedraja 
and Bartelt could not have detected the smell from inside Jardines’s residence without the use of 
the dog sniff technology. Detective Pedraja’s smell is suspect because it occurred after he knew 
the dog had alerted to contraband. This information could not have been verified through visual 
surveillance. Third, neither thermal-imaging devices nor drug-detecting canines are technologies 
used by the general public.
In response to the third difference, this Court draws the line on technology that is not in 
general public use. Id. Advancements in technology (as well as transportation and
^ Agents were using the thermal-imagining device to look for high-intensity marijuana grow lamps. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 
at 29.
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communication) have diminished a person’s expectation of privacy in their “effects.” See. e.g.. 
Place, 462 U.S. at 708; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40; Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409. However, these 
advancements provide reciprocal benefits to the people that choose to use them. A person drives 
a car knowing that anyone who is looking can see him. A person permits a Global Positioning 
System (“GPS”) device to know his location in order to obtain turn-by-tum directions. This 
information is available by choice. The dog sniff, however, is a one-way technology, which 
allowed the Government to peer into Jardines’s life without his consent or a reciprocal benefit. 
Therefore, the dog sniff conducted on Jardines’s home was a search.
C. The Doa Sniff Constituted a Trespass on Jardines’s Home.
This Court expanded the amount of privacy that a person may expect under the Fourth 
Amendment in the recent case of United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). \n Jones, 
government agents installed a GPS on the respondent’s vehicle without a warrant and tracked its 
movements for twenty-eight days. Id. at 948. The respondent was later indicted for a narcotics 
conspiracy. Id. This Court ultimately held that the government attaching the GPS to the 
respondent’s vehicle and using it to track his whereabouts constituted a trespass and search under 
the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 949. In reaching this decision, this Court noted that the Katz test 
adds to—and does not substitute for—the common law trespass test. Id. at 952. Thus, a physical 
intrusion on an “effect” is a search because this type of invasion would have been eonsidered a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment back when it was adopted. Id. Therefore, 
placing a GPS on the respondent’s car constituted a trespass under common law. Id. at 949.
The common law trespass test is appropriate for the home. The home is not progressing 
the same way that the other “effects” mentioned in the Fourth Amendment are. Transportation, 
technology, and conununication have all changed drastically since the Fourth Amendment was
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adopted. See supra, § II.B. However, the home is essentially the same, and the heightened 
privacy that this Court has always afforded it has not changed.
The Government may argue that the present case differs from Jones because the police 
did not attach anything to Jardines’s home and the dog snitf did not affect how he operated his 
home. However, the dog sniff pierced the walls of Jardines’s house, exposing something that 
was not open to surveillance from the outside. In effect, the dog sniff gave Detective Bartelt 
access to the interior of Jardines’s residence. Therefore, following the reasoning in Jones, the 
dog sniff constituted a technical trespass on Jardines’s private home.
fhe dog sniff on Jardines’s residence was clearly a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
The sniff was at a home, which inarguably is afforded the greatest constitutional protection. 
Furthermore, the sniff intruded upon both Jardines’s subjective and objective expectation of 
privacy under tlie Katz test because the smells emanating from his home were not exposed to the 
public. Furthermore, the general public does not have access to dog sniff technology and 
therefore a warrant is necessary for this type of technology to be used. Thus, it was paramount 
for the Government to have obtained a valid search warrant before conducting the search upon 
Jardines’s home.
II. THE USE OF A SOPHISTICATED AND INTRUSIVE DOG SNIFF AT A PRIVATE 
RESIDENCE IS A SEARCH UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT THAT 
REQUIRES A SHOWING OF PROBABLE CAUSE, RATHER THAN REASONABLE 
SUSPICION.
The Fourth Amendment requires that officers obtain a warrant based on probable cause to 
search a person’s home. See supra, § 1. The dog sniff at Jardines’s residence was both a search 
when analyzed under the Katz test and a trespass when viewed under the Jones test. See supra, § 
I.A., I.C. In both of these circumstances, this Court has required that a warrant be supported by 
probable cause. This Court should follow the default rule, underscored in the Fourth
Amendment, that a warrant based on probable cause is obtained or, at the very least, reasonable 
suspicion be present, prior to conducting a dog sniff at a private residence.
A. The Officers Should Be Required To Show Probable Cause Because the Sniff
Was a Search That Intruded Upon Jardines’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy.
Intruding on a person's privacy interest without a warrant to perform a search or seizure is 
unconstitutional. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. Absent an exception, such as special needs, eonsent or 
exigent circumstanees, a search requires that a warrant be based on probable cause and describes 
the places to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const, amend. IV; see, e.g., 
Payton, 445 U.S. at 573; but see United States v. De Los Santos Ferrer, 999 F.2d 7 (1st Cir.
1993) (holding that the dog sniff of defendant’s luggage was not a search and therefore did not 
require probable cause or a warrant). Since a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy is most 
powerful in a home, see supra, § I.A., and no exception exists here, this Court should apply the 
default rule necessitating a warrant exhibiting probable cause.
Whether a dog sniff at the front porch of a residence is a search that requires probable 
cause depends on the strength of the privacy interest invaded. See supra, § LA. 1. Where a 
person exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy in a manner and of a subject that society 
objectively accepts, probable cause is required for almost all types of government intrusion. 
Katz,^^9 U.S. at 361.
Canine sniffs that reveal information about the odors in a defendant's home cannot be 
considered anything other than a standard Fourth Amendment search requiring probable cause. 
Terry has established the principle that “[a] careful balancing of governmental and private 
interests suggests that the public interest is best served by Fourth Amendment standard of 
reasonableness that stops short of probable cause.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 
(1985) (discussing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). However, this balancing test is only
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#appropriate when “special needs” or an exception exists. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives ’ 
Assoc., 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (recognizing that the warrant requirement can be set aside 
where special needs exist).
A dog sniff cannot fall under the exception to probable cause as minimally invasive 
because it invades Jardines’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Reasonable suspicion has been 
upheld in cases where the search was minimally invasive. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648 (1979) (applying a standard of reasonable suspicion for officers checking drivers 
licenses). Nevertheless, dog sniffs at a home are not minimally invasive because the individual 
of the search has a heightened expectation of privacy in their home. 150 A.L.R. § 399 (1998). 
Thus, unlike the minimally invasive search in Prouse, which occurred on a public road, the dog 
sniff was conducted at Jardines’s private residence and therefore interfered with his reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Moreover, dog sniffs can be imprecise and can incorrectly detect lawful 
possessions. Accordingly, as held by the Supreme Court of Florida, this type of search requires 
probable cause.
1. A well-trained canine is not always precise when alerting to illegal drugs.
While the Place doctrine is premised upon the assumption that dogs are highly accurate, 
this notion is not so clearly supported. Place, 462 U.S. at 707. Indeed, a dog sniff can be 
unreliable and can create the potential of revealing intimate details. Justice Souter demonstrated 
this by pointing to studies that show dogs “[r]eturn false positives anywhere from 12.5% to 60% 
of the time depending on the length of the search.” Caballes, 543 at 411 (Souter, J. dissenting); 
see also United States v. Limares, 269 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 2001) (observing a dog with a 
false alert rate between 7% and 38%); United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1378 (10th Cir. 
1997) (utilizing evidence obtained by a drug dog with a 29% false positive rate). Justice Souter
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concluded that the evidence is clear that if a dog alerts hundreds of times, he will be wrong over 
a dozen times. Id. Thus, even generally reliable dogs can falsely alert. This error rate is 
troubling when one acknowledges the fact that most people do not possess contraband. Due to 
such a high rate of false positives, an officer should be required to show probable cause in order 
to raise suspicion that an individual may actually possess illegal drugs.
A dog handler can also further affect a canine’s accuracy. 1 he relationship between a 
dog and its handler is vital to the performance of a dog sniff, and the handler’s actions can 
immensely influence the dog’s behavior. Dave Hunter, Comment, Common Scents: Establishing 
a Presumption of Reliability for Detector Dog Teams Use in Airports in Light of the Current 
Terrorist Threat, 28 U. Dayton L. Rev. 89, 89 (2002). A handler can cue the dog that contraband 
is present by consciously or unconsciously sending the dog signals. Richard E. Myers II, Note, 
Detector Dogs and Probable Cause, 14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1, 20-21 (2006). Here, Franky was 
on the leash held by Detective Bartelt at the time of the sniff. (J.A. 51.) The Detective could 
have easily alerted to the dog, consciously or unconsciously, by controlling Franky through the 
leash and sending signals to him by moving the leash. Further, the Detective testified that 
normally handlers drop the leash and walk away from the dog while they are performing a sniff. 
(J.A. 52.) However, the Detective stated that Franky was a wild dog and, as such, he had to hold 
onto the leash. (J.A. 52.) Detective Bartelt did not adhere to the common practices of dog 
handlers, which further shows that Franky’s alert to “drugs” may not have been an accurate one. 
The fallibility of canine sniffs prevents the dog from revealing merely contraband, thus reducing 
the minimally invasive nature of the search.
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2. A dog sniff conducted at the front door of a residence is a major intrusion 
upon the object of the search.
An individual’s expectation of privacy applies with extra force when the sanctity of a 
home is concerned. See supra, § LA. While in Place, Justice O’Connor presumed that a dog 
sniff was a minor intrusion when it involves a suitcase; this holding was limited to objects 
outside the home. See supra, § I.A.2. This Court has consistently held that a home is a special 
place that requires greater constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; Payton, 445 
U.S.at 601.
Further, given the limited nature of a dog sniff conducted on small inanimate objects like 
luggage, the passenger is caused limited annoyance, inconvenience and humiliation in that 
situation. See Peter Thornton, Police Use of Sense-Enhancing Devices and the Limits of the 
Fourth Amendment, 1977 U. Ill. L. F. 1167, 1168 (1977). Thus, while the Terry doctrine 
allowing a standard of less than probable cause may apply in cases like Place where the intrusion 
is limited, a home is afforded greater constitutional protection. See supra, § I.A.; Kyllo, 533 U.S. 
at 37 (“In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is 
held safe from prying government eyes.”); Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511 (stating that the right of a 
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion” is 
at the core of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1366 (2d Cir. 
1985) (“[A] practice that is not intrusive in a public airport may be intrusive when employed at a 
person's home.”).
Additionally, the home sniff in this case required more than five officers and took over an 
hour to complete, which demonstrates that the sniff was not a simple and quick practice. (J.A.
17, 32, 109.) The nature and scope of the dog sniff at a home is intrusive because it invariably 
results in embarrassment, inconvenience, and fear. See supra, § I. A.2. Voyeurs could easily be
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witnessing the scene from their windows and assume that their neighbor is a criminal. This type 
of humiliation is precisely what the Fourth Amendment aims to protect. Because Jardines had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his home, the officers were required to obtain a warrant 
based on probable cause before initiating a dog sniff at Jardines’s residence.
3. The totality of the circumstances demonstrates that no other special 
exceptions exist that would diminish the standard of probable cause 
required for a search.
Where a special exception exists, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, police 
officials can depart from the warrant and probable cause requirement. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; 
see also Payton, 445 U.S. at 586. However, no such special circumstances were present here. 
The relevant exceptions include consent searches, special needs, and exigent circumstances. See 
generally, Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619; Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 37 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. 
Grim. Proc. 39 (2008). If any of these exceptions exist, this Court has held that there will be no 
hesitation “to balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the 
warrant and probable-cause requirements in the particular context.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619. 
Thus, even if this Court were to determine that special exceptions existed, Jardines’s privacy 
interests must still be considered. However, since none of the above exceptions were present, it 
was necessary for the Detectives to adhere to the warrant requirement.
Government agents may conduct a search absent probable cause if there is voluntary 
consent. To determine if there was voluntary consent, this Court looks at the totality of the 
circumstances and weighs factors that determine whether the individual had knowledge of their 
rights, the degree of cooperation, and if consent was conscionable. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218, 223-27 (1973). Consent did not occur here. Jardines was not present at the time 
of the sniff so it was impossible for him to provide consent. (J.A. 43-44.) Therefore, the
Government cannot use consent as an exception to the probable cause requirement.
The special needs exception may also dispense with the warrant and probable cause 
requirement in certain limited situations. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 
(2001). In order for a special need search to be valid, the government must acknowledge a real, 
current, and vital problem that will be addressed through the proposed search. See Chandler v. 
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318-19 (1997) (holding that lack of “concrete danger” of drug use indicates 
that government interest in deterring such abuse is not sufficiently vital to qualify as a special 
need and bypass Fourth Amendment protection); but see Palmieri v. Lynch, 392 F.3d 73, 84-86 
(2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the government’s special interest in preserving wetlands and natural 
resources justified a special needs inspection of residential property). Due to the character of the 
intrusion and the privacy interest at stake, the permissibility of a special needs search is heavily 
fact dependent. See Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314.
In this case, however, there were no special needs that would permit a search without 
probable cause. The distinct circumstances where special needs searches have been permitted 
have included drug testing in the employment context, drug testing of public school students and 
searches of individuals subject to government control. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633- 
34 (permitting warrantless drug testing of railroad employees pursuant to government regulations 
requiring railroads to conduct blood and urine tests of employees involved in major train 
accidents); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 525 U.S. 646,655 (1995) (permitting 
suspicionless drug testing of public school students participating in interscholastic athletics); 
Grijfm v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872-73 (1987) (upholding a warrantless search of 
probationer's home conducted pursuant to a state regulation). Each of the above cases presented 
special needs that only exist in unusual circumstances. Here, the Government never articulated
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any such circumstance nor is it apparent that any special need existed for them to conduct a 
search not pursuant to the Fourth Amendment. Since the Government did not demonstrate that 
the search in question addressed any special needs, it can safely be assumed that no such need 
existed.
Finally, the Government may conduct a warrantless search if exigent circumstances 
justify the imposition. These circumstances exist when there is imminent danger, a public safety 
concern, or when law enforcement safety is threatened. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 
298-99 (1967) (holding that exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search for an armed 
robbery suspect and weapons because delay would endanger lives of officers and citizens).
Since the police were solely conducting the search off an anonymous, unverified tip, exigent 
circumstances were not present. (J.A. 16.) Furthermore, the tip was given one month before the 
Detectives conducted the sniff at Jardines’s residence, demonstrating that the circumstances in 
no way were exigent. (J.A. 16.) If the Detectives were afraid that the suspect would destroy or 
move the contraband, they would have conducted the search almost immediately. Moreover, a 
marijuana growhouse, located inside of a home, does not create an imminent danger to citizens. 
Finally, the Detectives offered no testimony that Jardines threatened members of law 
enforcement. Since the Detectives took such a long time to conduct the sniff, and because there 
were no circumstances that demonstrate an imminent threat to public safety, exigent 
circumstances justifying a warrantless search were non-existent.
4. Conducting an investigation that satisfies probable cause, before a dog 
sniff, is not unreasonably burdensome and provides officer objectivity.
Requiring an evidentiary showing of probable cause before conducting a dog sniff at a 
home does not create a higher or different standard than the one already stated in the Fourth 
Amendment, nor is requiring such a showing unreasonable. In fact, requiring a warrant prior to
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conducting a dog sniff benefits both law enforcement and the general public by creating a 
standard tliat requires more complete documentation. Most officers conduct an extensive 
investigation regardless of what standard applies in the situation in order to have valid 
evidentiary support. Such an investigation is routine and will not prevent law enforcement 
officers from protecting the citizenry.
The warrant requirement should not be set aside for the convenience of law enforcement. 
Moreover, the core purpose of the warrant requirement is to prevent officers from exercising 
immediate discretion in evaluating whether their actions are reasonable. See Johnson, 333 U.S. 
at 14. Under the Government’s theory, police would be free to walk narcotic sniffing canines 
door-to-door through neighborhoods. Lewis R. Katz & Aaron P. Golembiewski, Curbing the 
Dog: Extending the Protection of the Fourth Amendment to Police Drug Dogs, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 
735, 111 (2007). This type of arbitrary police action is precisely what this Court was trying to 
eliminate in Terry. See infra, § II.B. 1. While requiring a warrant may lake slightly more time 
and effort for police detectives, it does not frustrate their ability to ultimately conduct the dog 
sniff.
It is also necessary to have sufficient evidentiary support before conducting a sniff 
because there are numerous situations where dogs falsely alert to the presence of contraband.
See supra, § II.A. 1. However, these cases are rarely litigated making it difficult to see and 
consider the harmful effects of conducting a dog sniff on innocent citizens. Additionally, this 
Court has emphasized that we must “sometimes insulate[] the criminality of a few in order to 
protect the privacy of us all.” Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987). Therefore, while 
there may be a compelling government interest in ridding our country of drugs, the sanctity of 
the home and personal privacy requires that no citizen be subjected to government interference
of this kind without a showing of probable cause, objectively reviewed by a judicial officer.
B. Even If Probable Cause Is Not Required, the Detectives Must Show Reasonable
Suspicion.
1. Courts have not limited Terry by its specific facts in the past and should 
apply the Terry standard to this case in the event this Court does not 
require probable cause.
If this Court determines that probable cause is not required prior to conducting the dog 
sniff, then, as in Terry, reasonable suspicion is appropriate. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. Terry created 
an exception to the probable cause requirement in which the lesser standard of reasonable 
suspicion is applied. This Court defines reasonable suspicion as when a reasonable prudent 
person in the particular circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his or her safety or 
that of others was in danger. Id. at 27. Terry involved the stop-and-frisk of a person who the 
police believed to be planning a robbery. Id. at 16. The frisk involved the police patting down 
the exterior of the defendant’s clothing to search for weapons. Id. at 17. To resolve if the stop- 
and-frisk was a search, the Court focused on whether the intrusion into the defendant’s privacy 
and security was reasonable and not arbitrary. Id. at 19. The Terry test considers (1) “whether 
the officer’s action was justified at its inception,’’ and (2) “whether it was reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Id. at 19-20. Thus, 
the Court determined that reasonable suspicion is justified where the officer presents articulable 
suspicions. Id. at 27.
While Terry dealt with a stop-and-fnsk search, many courts have applied the Terry test to 
determine reasonableness, and should do so here. See, e.g., Horton, 690 F.2d at 476. By 
adhering to a standard of reasonableness, the Court in Terry aimed to protect an individual’s 
Fourth Amendment rights by determining that an officer has to show articulable facts that 
reasonably warrant an intrusion. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. When making this assessment, the
officer must use an objective standard that the action taken is appropriate in light ot 
constitutional safeguards. Id. Thus, the standard protects individuals from being arbitrarily 
padded down at an officer’s whim. Just as the Court in Terry sought to give substantial weight 
to Fourth Amendment protections, this Court should require at the very least a standard of 
reasonableness to prevent all houses from being arbitrarily sniffed by canines. To require less 
than a showing of reasonable suspicion undermines the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
and would be contrary public policy. The very nature of the privacy interest at stake supports the 
llirtherance of policy requiring reasonable suspicion prior to conducting a canine sniff at a 
residence.
2. The facts articulated by Detectives Pedraja and Bartelt do not support a 
finding of reasonable suspicion.
Here, the Detectives have not offered sufficient justification for conducting the canine 
sniff. An uncorroborated allegation from an anonymous source whose reliability was unknown 
was insufficient under the Fourth Amendment to give the Officers reasonable suspicion. While 
Terry recognized that a suspicion is justified if a reasonably prudent officer in the same 
circumstances would believe his safety was in jeopardy, the Court also asserted that an officer 
must have more than an inchoate or “hunch.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. Furthermore, this Court 
underscored that if presented with an anonymous tip, “police must observe additional suspicious 
circumstances as a result of... independent investigation” before the police can act on the tip. 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990). Here, the anonymous tip was the only source of 
information the Detectives had obtained before conducting the dog sniff at Jardines s residence. 
(J.A. 16.)
The determination of reasonableness governing any type of search requires “balancing 
the need to search against the invasion of privacy the search entails. T.L.O.,469 U.S. at 337.
On one side of the scale is the individual’s expectation of privacy and on the other, the 
government’s need to keep public order. Id. Since the Detectives offered no testimony 
demonstrating that the circumstances were exigent, see supra, § II.A.3., the Detectives had 
ample opportunity to do further investigation into the possible criminal activity at the home. 
Simply gathering information about Jardines’s electricity bill, verifying the source, or substantial 
officer surveillance may have given the Officers enough suspicion to adliere to the 
reasonableness standard set out in Terry, and establish the type of necessity articulated in T.L.O. 
However, the Detectives neglected to gather any information and, instead, conducted the dog 
sniff on a mere hunch. Since the Detectives did not acknowledge any articulable facts 
demonstrating their suspicion, the uncorroborated tip can be equated with an inchoate inkling 
and, as such, reasonable suspicion was not present prior to the search.
If this Court does not establish that probable cause is the requisite standard for 
conducting a canine sniff at Jardines’s home, Terry demonstrates that at the very least there 
should be a compulsory standard of reasonable suspicion. However, it is apparent that the 
Detectives did not demonstrate any articulable basis to meet a reasonableness standard, since the 
single anonymous tip they received was unverified and uncorroborated. Therefore, neither 
probable cause nor reasonable suspicion had been met.
CONCLUSION
The Government violated Jardines’s reasonable expectation of privacy by performing the 
dog sniff at his home and therefore the sniff was a search requiring a warrant. Furthermore, the 
warrant must be based on probable cause since the search was intrusive and used sophisticated 
technology that revealed intimate details of Jardines’s home. Finally, even if this Court
determines that reasonable suspicion is the requisite standard here, the Detectives did not have 
enough information to meet either standards and should not have performed the search.
For the reasons stated above, this court should AFFIRM the Florida Supreme Court and 
find that the dog sniff on Jardines’s home violated the Fourth Amendment.
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